

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

An Open Access Journal

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Volume 22, Issue 3

RELIGION IN THE AXIOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF KAZAKHSTANI YOUTH

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DOI:: <https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.3.015>

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ABSTRACT

Together with independence, the Republic of Kazakhstan reacquired its lost traditional values; religion, controlled and suppressed by the Soviet atheist ideology, being one of the most important elements along with the growing number of religious communities and associations, as well as places of public worship.

Today, religiosity is on the rise, especially among the younger generation: everyday religious practices are observed by individuals or groups of people at workplaces and homes and in the course of communication. The author has analyzed the role of religion in axiological orientation and the level of religious feelings of the young people aged 18-22 on the basis of sociological poll results.

Keywords: religion, youth, Kazakhstan, values, Islam, radicalism.

Introduction

The Soviet Union's disintegration led to significant changes in the economic, political, social and ideological spheres of everyday life of the Kazakhstani society. The time has come to seek and discover its own identity: the Soviet Union provided a stable albeit incomplete foundation of people's identity by protecting them against a variety of ideas outside its borders.¹

The Constitution of Kazakhstan defines it as "a democratic, secular, legal and social state".² The 1992 Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations became the legal foundation for the relationships in the religious sphere. It was subsequently replaced by the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 11 October, 2011 On Religious Activity and Religious Associations. According to Art 3.6 "Everybody shall have the right to hold religious or other creed, promulgate it or to participate in the activity of religious associations and carry out missionary activity in compliance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan."³ As could be expected, greater rights in the religious sphere increased the number of religious communities and associations, as well as the number of new and restored old mosques and other public worship buildings. Islamic faith was revived, the number of Muslims and places of worship increased. According to official statistics, in 2003 there were 1,652 Muslim communities in Kazakhstan; and their number is on the rise.

Today, there are 3,808 religious associations in the country. They belong 18 confessions: 2,673 of them belong to Islam; 343 are Orthodox; 592, Protestant; 86, Catholic; 60 belong to Jehovah's Witnesses; 24, to the New Apostolic Church; 12, to the International Society of Krishna Consciousness; 7 are Judaic; 6, Bahai; 2 belong to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons); 1 is created by Moonies. There are 3,592 functioning cultic buildings; 2,683 of them are mosques, 302, Orthodox churches; 108, Catholic Churches; 407, Protestant praying houses; 57 praying houses belong to Jehovah's Witnesses; 24, to the New Apostolic Church; 6 are synagogues; 2, praying houses of Bahai; 2, praying houses of the International Society of



Krishna Consciousness; 1 praying house belongs to the local Buddhists.⁴

Non-traditional religious associations, clandestine religious organizations of destructive nature that teach their members to violate Kazakhstani laws are also active.

The role of religion in the social and political life of Kazakhstan is rising by the year. We have already learned from global experience that religion may become an independent political force that oversteps the bounds of religious activities proper, with a result that is not necessarily positive. Amid the plummeting socio-economic standards of everyday life, dissatisfaction with the authorities' actions and politics and the spiritual and moral disorientation, people rely on religion as one of the forms of self-identification, socialization and, possibly, radicalization.⁵

This is fraught with all sorts of dangers since the youth, as the most vulnerable part of any society, with no firm axiological values and social statuses often falls into the trap of the most radical forms in search of new ideas and their realization. The absence of firm ideas and practical experience makes the younger generation easy prey to manipulations of all sorts.

Quintan Wiktorowicz, a well-known expert, has identified “four key processes that enhance the likelihood that a potential joiner will be drawn to a radical Islamic group and eventually persuaded to participate:

- (1) cognitive opening—an individual becomes receptive to the possibility of new ideas and worldviews;
- (2) religious seeking—the individual seeks meaning through a religious idiom;
- (3) frame alignment—the public representation proffered by the radical group ‘makes sense’ to the seeker and attracts his or her initial interest;
- (4) socialization—the individual experiences religious lessons and activities that facilitate indoctrination, identity-construction, and value changes.”⁶

On the whole, society and its younger segment in particular, has been displaying a significant interest in religion as an element of their culture, which strongly affects their behavior. I have tasked myself with analyzing the level of religiosity and perception of religion by the younger generation; the role of religion in axiological orientation, the level of knowledge about the religious situation in the country, the mechanism of influence on young people's religious convictions and assessing the general level of religious culture of this generation. I hypothesized that religion among these age groups is presented at the level of identity, religious traditions are accepted practically from birth and, to a much lesser extent, in the form of religious practices.

Method of Studies

I relied on sociological polls carried out among young people aged between 18 and 22, who are far more responsive than other age groups to all sorts of manipulations used by fake religious associations, fake convictions, etc. The 200-respondent sample consists of students of Almaty higher educational establishments; the poll was carried out online with the help of Survey Monkey.

The Law on the State Youth Policy adopted in 2015 refers to citizens between 14 and 29 as youth. In 2020, this group comprised 3,765,383 members. In the city of Almaty, the number of youth for the same period amounted to 393,845 people.

On 1 February, 2021, there were 18,897,898 people living in Kazakhstan. According to the 2009 population census the population was 16,009,597 people strong among whom 11,239,176 (72.2%) were Muslims; 4,214,232 (26.3%), Christians; 5,281 (0.03%), Judaists; 14,663 (0.09%), Buddhists; 451,547 (2.82%) were unbelievers.⁷

Table 1

Population by Religious and Age (15-29) Groups in 2009

	Total	Of Them Those Who Disclosed Their Religious Affiliation						Refused to Disclose
		Islam	Christianity	Judaism	Buddhism	Other	Non-believers	
15-19	1,544,995	1,208,368	287,641	297	965	383	40,319	7,022
20-24	1,605,090	1,175,293	374,506	534	1,300	345	45,283	7,829
25-29	1,342,309	949,888	344,867	568	1,191	234	38,723	6,838

Source: Analiticheskiy otechet "Itogi Natsionalnoy Perepisi Naseleniya Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda".

Since the majority of the believers among the younger population of Kazakhstan are Muslims the threats of radicalization are connected with the spread of non-traditional versions of Islam among younger people, we will discuss mainly young Muslims even if the data of public opinion polls shown in diagrams and tables are related to all young people irrespective of religious convictions or their absence.



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Religiosity in Kazakhstan in the Past

Martha Brill Olcott has written in her *Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise* that traditional Kazakh Islam has preserved many more pre-Islamic features than Islam practiced in the cities of Uzbekistan and in the south of Kyrgyzstan, since the process of Islamization among the Kazakhs went on until the 18th century, while their nomadic life style made it a ritual rather than a doctrine. Kazakhs had no complicated system of educational establishments, holy places and Muslim street committees typical of the faithful to the south of Kazakhstan.⁸

The main role in spreading Islam among Kazakhs belonged to Arab missionaries who gradually taught the local people to see Sunni Islam as a flexible and liberal teaching, which widely applied the norms of *adat*, the local common law. Their descendants – Sayyids and Khoja – became hereditary nomad aristocracy in the traditional Kazakh society of the 16th-19th centuries. In the 18th-20th centuries they merged into one Khoja group.⁹

In the 16th century, Kazakh khans and their retinue abandoned shamanism to adopt Islam, yet the main groups of their followers remained indifferent to the new religion until the end of the 18th-early 19th century when they fell under the spell of Tatar clerics. At the early stages, czarist bureaucrats did not oppose Islamization. Later, however, convinced that it contradicted the interests of the Russian Empire, they made unsuccessful attempts to replace it with Russian Orthodoxy.¹⁰ Mosques were built under the supervision of reliable Tatar mullahs. Their number increased, while the intensified propaganda of Islam made fanatics out of the local nomads. Since the latter half of the 19th century, Islam has spread far and wide. For instance, Syrymbatyr was captured while praying; batyr Jankhoja was also killed during prayer.¹¹

Soviet power relied on the Red Army and security forces to suppress organized religion across Central Asia as a threat to regional security and outlawed all Islamic structures. The 1920s remained in the memory of common people as a “cultural offensive.” “Mosques were closed and the property of Islamic authorities was confiscated. Sufis bore the brunt of this harsh repression, so much so that one can talk of a resulting ‘loss of the collective memory of Sufism in Central Asia’. Sufi leaders were arrested, and many were executed. Furthermore, the religious schools in which they transmitted knowledge were closed, and Sufi texts banned. Instead, Muslim children were indoctrinated with anti-Islamic material as an integral part of Soviet education policy.”¹²

After World War II, the Soviet government permitted religious rites and religious education as an inalienable part of nationality policy, which led to a stronger ethnic/religious correlation. The Muslim identity of the Kazakhs blended with their national identity; traditional Muslim practices became part of the Soviet concept of culture, and the Kazakhs’ religious identity—an aspect of their national cultural heritage. In Soviet times, those religious practices that existed outside the sphere that was sanctioned and controlled by the state and spiritual administrations were defined as “parallel” Islam and outlawed.¹³

According to Dosym Satpaev, a prominent political scientist from Kazakhstan, the ideological vacuum left by the Soviet Union became a fertile soil for religious extremism. He has defined three waves of religious extremism. The first rose in the 1990s, when students from Kazakhstan went to Islamic countries to continue their religious education. The second arrived in the early 2000s from the west, Russia’s North Caucasian region which was earlier in a state of military conflict with Moscow. The third wave is connected with Al-Qa’eda and the Islamic State and their fairly successful propaganda on social media and messengers. To a certain extent, they look fashionable and attractive to the younger generations, especially to the uneducated and jobless youths.¹⁴ According to official information, over 20,000 in Kazakhstan are associated with destructive religious ideologies; the greatest numbers being registered in Atyrau, South Kazakhstan, Aktobe and Karaganda regions and the cities of Almaty and Nur-Sultan.¹⁵

Erlan Karin, one of the best security experts in Kazakhstan, who heads the Center for Antiterrorist Programs, is convinced that radical cells in Kazakhstan are a combination of criminal and religious communities and groups. He has pointed out social and political factors (unemployment, low incomes, criminalization, marginalization of the younger generation, corruption and lower role of many social and political institutions) as increasing social injustice, stirring up radicalism and supplying those who preach radicalism with arguments.¹⁶

The following factors are the most significant when it comes to the spread of radicalism in Kazakhstan:

- 1. Marginalization of society, dramatic changes in the social and cultural milieu (urbanization of rural population, a change in occupation or enrollment at an educational establishment);
- 2. Criminalization of the minds and social relationships (lowered trust in the law and power structures, heroization of leaders of criminal organizations, proliferation of “criminal” ideas among the younger generation);
- 3. Lack of religious knowledge (primitive ideas about religion, the “neophyte” effect, an absence of spiritual leaders, weak positions of official clergy against the background of activities of members of non-traditional schools);
- 4. The information factor (the Internet as the main source of religious knowledge);
- 5. The geopolitical factor (certain forces want to spread radicalism far and wide as a source of financial, human and political resources everywhere, Kazakhstan being no exception).¹⁷



Results and Discussions

It should be said that the changing role of religion is accompanied by the altered value orientations of the individual and society as a whole. Secularism, modernization and other global trends affect the religious sphere; in fact, in this context religion becomes a social institution and a value per se. This makes the studies of the role of religion in the lives of younger generations who grew up in an independent country and in conditions of religious pluralism especially important.

Table 2


Which Religion Do You Yourself Identify With?

Responses	%
Muslim	72
Orthodox Christian	18
Catholic	1
Atheist	2.5
No answer	4.5
Other	2
Undecided	0

According to our studies, the majority of respondents (36.5%) considered themselves religious; they, however, rarely observe religious norms; 26% are rarely involved in religious life; 14% of the polled are involved in the life of their religious communities and observe religious norms; 6.5% do not believe in religion, but respect the faithful; 8% of the young Kazakhstanis do not consider themselves religious, yet sometimes attend religious services and observe religious norms; 3.5% are indifferent to religion; 1.5% are atheists (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1


Do You Consider Yourself a Religious Person? %



We have received the following answers to the statement that “In recent years increasingly more young people have been turning to religion. What do you think of this fact?” 38.5% answered that they approved, rather than disapproved; 20.5% completely approved; 17.5% were undecided; 11%, rather disapproved and 9.5% of the young respondents disapproved completely (see Fig. 2).

Figure 2

In Recent Years, Increasingly More Young People Have Been Turning to Religion. What Do You Think of This Fact? %



In Kazakhstan, there are 229 regional information groups established to clarify religious issues. Twenty of them are operating in regions, 49, in cities and 160, in districts. In the fourth quarter of 2020, their 2,605 experts carried out 4,737 events of various




scopes in which 349,807 people were involved; 2,042 of them were carried out among young people with 112,407 participants.

These groups deal mainly with their target population groups: young people, believers, unemployed, convicts and members of their families, people employed by private enterprises, those who work in trade and the services sphere, etc.

According to our poll, the majority of young Kazakhstanis do not have complete information about the religious situation in the country; 46% of the polled, however, know something, while 23% said that they learn quite a lot from the media; 17% were not interested at all, while 8.5% have no information and no time to obtain it (see Fig. 3).

Figure 3


How Do You Assess the Level of Your Knowledge About the Religious Situation in the Country?, %



The question “Do you know of the laws that regulate the religious sphere in Kazakhstan?” invited the following responses: 58.5% said that they have heard something, but do not have enough information; 25.5% knew nothing about the laws; 12.5% were aware of such laws, while 3.5% were undecided (see Fig. 4).

Figure 4

Do You Know the Laws That Regulate the Religious Sphere in Kazakhstan? %



In Kazakhstan, opposition to terrorism and religious extremism are deeply rooted in the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan, viz. On National Security adopted in 1998 and On Anti-Terrorist Struggle of 1999, which were further supported by the laws On Opposition to Extremism of 2005, On Opposition to Legalization (Laundering) of Incomes Acquired by Illegal Means and Funding Terrorism of 2009 and On Religious Activities and Religious Associations of 2011.

In the fourth quarter of 2020, the law and order structures uncovered 76 administrative offenses in the religious sphere. For 34 of them, law enforcement agencies opened cases under Arts 453 and 489 of the Code of Administrative Offenses.

The responses to the question “How do you assess the religious policy of your state?” revealed that slightly more than half of the respondents assessed it as efficient to different degrees (67% in all); 17% of the young respondents assessed it as inefficient, while a fairly big share (16%) were undecided (see Fig. 5).


Figure 5

How Do You Assess the Religious Policy of Your State? %



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
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Today, youth is the most active user of the Internet and social networks, which explains why those who are gathering new members under the banners of radical religious teachings and in the ranks of radical religious organizations mainly rely on information technologies. Online radicalization, therefore, requires urgent action. Indeed, a large share of our respondents (34.5%) said that they received information about religion from the Internet; 33.5% obtain information from close relatives; 17%, from religious figures; 5.5%, from religious literature; 3.5%, from TV; 6% were undecided (see Fig. 6).

Figure 6


Where Do You Mostly Obtain Information About Religion? %



We have studied the extent to which the social environment affects religious views of the younger generation in Kazakhstan by analyzing their responses to the question “Who or what affects your religious convictions to the greatest extent?” Forty percent of the polled named close relatives and family members; 27% answered “nothing”, 10.5% pointed at religious associations, discussions with imams or priests yet described their influence as insignificant; 10% are influenced by religious literature and the Internet; 6.5%, by friends and acquaintances; 6% were undecided (see Fig. 7).

Figure 7

Who or What Affects Your Religious Convictions to the Greatest Extent? %




Our question “Why do people join terrorist extremist groups?” invited the following answers: 26.5% pointed at the low educational level; 21%, the low level of religious culture and education; 16.5%, religious fanaticism, 10%, the plummeting standard of living; 3% were convinced that people are driven to religious extremism by ethnic discrimination and the ideological vacuum (see Fig. 8).

Figure 8

Why Do People Join Terrorist Extremist Groups? %






According to our poll, when asked “Do you frequently attend religious services?” the majority (42.5%) answered that they do it on special days; 33%, practically never; the rest of the polled group (7%) answered that they participate once a week; less than once a year (6.5%); once a year (5.5%); once a month (4.5%); a small share of the respondents (1%) attend religious services more often than once a week. The majority of our respondents considered themselves religious people, yet most of them did not attend religious services (see Fig. 9)

Figure 9

Do You Frequently Attend Religious Services? %



Forty-seven percent fully agree with the statement that religion affects the spiritual and moral education; 28% are convinced that it depends on the individual; 15% agreed that religion influences human lives and helps in certain situations; 7% are convinced that other socialization institutions should promote spiritual and moral education; 2.5% were unable to respond (see Fig. 10).

Figure 10

Do You Agree That the Faith and Attending Places of Worship Contribute to Spiritual and Moral Education of the Youth of Kazakhstan? %




Table 3

Should Religion Be Taught at Public Schools? %


Responses	%
Completely agree	16.5
Agree	37
Disagree	20
Completely disagree	10.5
Not sure	16



According to sociological studies, religion holds a great degree of public confidence in Kazakhstan. We have established this fact on the basis of responses to the question “To which extent do you trust religious organizations (mosques, churches)?” It turned out that 76.5% trust them completely or generally, with a very big share among youth; 8% do not wholly trust them; 9% preferred not to answer; 3% have no trust in them at all; 3.5% were undecided (see Fig. 11).

Figure 11


To Which Extent Do You Trust Religious Organizations (Mosques, Churches)? %



We received the following answers to the question about importance of religion in the lives of young people: 42.5% said that it is fairly important; 29.5%, very important; 14%, not very important; 7.5%, not important at all; 6.5% were not sure. This means that religion plays an important role in the lives of a very large share of young people (see Fig. 12).

Figure 12


How Important Is Religion For You? %



The answers to the question “With which of the following groups do you feel united?” allowed us to acquire a better understanding of religious identities. The biggest share of the young people of Kazakhstan feel united with the citizens of Kazakhstan—30.5%; with relatives, 21.5%; friends, 13.5%; 7.5% pointed at ethnic identity; 6% at members of the same generation; 4% feel no unity with none of the mentioned groups; 3.5% feel unity with the followers of the same religion. This means that so far it is too early to talk about sustained religious identity among the members of the younger generation (see Fig. 13).

Figure 13

With Which of the Following Groups Do You Feel United? %



Conclusion



The number of religious associations and buildings of cultic worship has been growing in Kazakhstan during the years of independence. Religious sentiment was spreading far and wide among youth and other groups. Our poll has produced the following results.

First, a fairly large share of the younger generation speaks of itself as religious, yet they do not observe religious norms and do not participate in religious life. Thirty-three percent practically never attend religious services, while 42.5% limit their involvement by observing religious holidays.

Second, young people obtain information about religion from the Internet; close relatives are the second most important source of such information; religious organizations and religious literature are less important in this respect. It seems that in the future the Internet will acquire even more consequence, which will increase the risks of online radicalization, promotion of false religious ideas and more active involvement of religious organizations. This means that the level of legal culture in relation to religion among the young people should be raised.

A fairly large share of the polled (72%) pointed out that religion is important to them, albeit to different degrees. At the same time, the religious convictions of the younger generations are shaped by the Internet, the family and close relatives, which means that socialization institutions have no role in the process.

We have discovered that our youth has acquired a civic identity and that the second largest group feels unity with relatives. Only 1% pointed to unity with members of their clans/zhuzes, one of the historically important traditional values. This means that religion occupies a fairly important place in the life of the younger generation which perceive it as an element of culture. Young people speak of themselves as religious, yet are not actively involved in religious activities. It seems that this trend will manifest even more clearly, yet it is hard to say whether religious feeling will become more profound.

¹ See: S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, J. Tucker, *Religion and the Secular State in Kazakhstan*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2017, p 12. [Back to text](#)

² Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (with amendments and additions as of 23.03.2019). [Back to text](#)

³ *The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 11 October, 2011, № 483-IV On Religious Activity and Religious Associations (with amendments and additions as of 15.11.2020)*. [Back to text](#)

⁴ See: “Information about the Religious Sphere,” Ministry of Information and Social Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2nd quarter of 2021), available at [\[Link\]](#) (in Russian). [Back to text](#)

⁵ See: D. Satpaev, T. Umbetalieva, A. Chebotarev *et al.*, *Kokteil Molotova: anatomii kazakhstanskoy molodezhi*, Almaty, 2014, p. 147. [Back to text](#)

⁶ Q. Wiktorowicz, *Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam*, Department of International Studies, Rhodes College, 2004, pp. 7-11. [Back to text](#)

⁷ See: *Analiticheskiy otchet “Itogi Natsionalnoy perepisi naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan 2009 goda”*, ed. by A.A. Smailov, Astana, 2011, 65 pp. [Back to text](#)

⁸ See: M. Olcott, *Kazakhstan: Neproydenny put*, Gendalf, Moscow, 2003, p. 237 [Back to text](#)

⁹ See: D. Vilkovski, *Arabo-islamskie organizatsii v sovremennom Kazakhstane: vneshnee vlianie na islamskoe vozrozhdenie*, IMEP at the Foundation of the First President, Astana-Almaty, 2014, p. 81. [Back to text](#)

¹⁰ See: T. Rakowska-Harmstone, “Islam and Nationalism: Central Asia and Kazakhstan under Soviet Rule,” *Central Asian Survey*, No. 2 (2), 2007, pp. 7-87. [Back to text](#)

¹¹ See: Zh. Artykbaev, *Kazakhskoe obshchestvo v XIX veke: traditsii i innovatsii*, Karaganda, 1993, p. 184. [Back to text](#)

¹² Z. Baran, *Hizb ut-Tahrir: Islam’s Political Insurgency*, Nixon Center, 2004, p. 70. [Back to text](#)

¹³ See: M.Y. Omelicheva, “Islam in Kazakhstan: A Survey of Contemporary Trends and Sources of Securitization,” *Central Asian Survey*, No. 30 (2), 2011, pp. 243-256. [Back to text](#)

¹⁴ See: D. Satpaev. “Profilaktika terrorizma v Kazakhstane. Cherez prizmu prav cheloveka.” Radio Azattv. available at [\[link\]](#) 18

KNB,” *Vlast*, available at [\[Link\]](#), 6 November ,2019. [Back to text](#)

¹⁶ See: E. Karin, “Osobennost radikalizma v RK—otsutstvie ideologicheskoy i religioznoy osnovy,” *Zakon.kz*, available at [\[Link\]](#), 19 July, 2016. [Back to text](#)

¹⁷ *Islamists in Kazakhstan—from a Common Believer to Terrorist*, Center for Security Programs and Public Social and Political Studies “Strategy,” Almaty, 2013, p. 12 (in Russian). [Back to text](#)

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
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